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"MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY"

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WHEN President Wilson in his War Message to Congress uttered his famous phrase about "making the world safe for democracy," it is doubtful if even he, with all his social and political acumen, understood all that was involved in such a proposition. Certain it is that very few of those who use the phrase so lightly understand. It has become a rallying war-cry, a catch-word to arouse enthusiasm for our doing our "bit" in the war. It would be a pity if it should turn out that this is the only use which we are to make of such a phrase. For surely there is contained in it a program for peace as well as for war; and much more for peace than for war, because the world can not be made "safe for democracy" through war. It is a commonplace with students of social history that war through all the ages has been one of the greatest enemies of democracy. Not only has militancy tended towards the rule of force and towards despotism in general, but even a defensive warfare, such as that in which we are now engaged, has more than once resulted in the subversion of democracy both in government and in society at large. The reasons for this will be plain as we proceed. We wish at this point merely to emphasize that war can never make the world "safe for democracy," and that a much larger program than winning the war is implied in that phrase.

The masses undoubtedly think of democracy merely as a form of government, the rule of the "people." Students of society, however, know that this is only one aspect of democracy and that democracy is to be understood only as a form of social life; that the political phases of democracy rest upon social and moral foundations much deeper than mere governmental forms. Even when conceived as "the rule of the people," the question always remains, "Who are the people?" This question has been answered so variously from age to age that the answers summarize the whole history and trend of democracy. In ancient Greece the "people" were a master

class imposing their authority as a sovereign group upon a population of which from one half to four fifths were slaves, and another very considerable fraction without citizenship rights. From the modern point of view Greek democracies, so-called, were not democracies at all, but were authoritarian, despotic societies, ruled by a very small oligarchic or aristocratic class. Throughout our own history, indeed, the definition of who constitutes the people has been so narrow that only a very small fraction of our population has had any actual share in the work of government. Slaves were excluded from our conception of the "people" until the Civil War, and women until very recent times.

On the other hand, in primitive times, modern anthropology tells us, as among some existing savage and barbarous peoples, there were democracies in which the "people" included all the adults recognized as belonging to a particular group. In these primitive democracies, such as those of many North American Indian tribes, clan and tribal assemblies or councils decided all matters pertaining to the group as a whole; and in such assemblies not only the men, but also the women, had a voice as a rule. There were two outstanding features of these primitive democracies, however, which sharply differentiate them from democracy as we think of it in the modern world. Majority rule was practically unknown among them but every decision which they reached regarding group action had to be a practically unanimous decision. This rule of unanimity made the the primitive democracy static, non-progressive, or at least very slow to make changes. Hence the second feature of their life which differs from ours was that democratic control with them was almost wholly the control of custom and tradition. Intelligence, after all, had a very small part to play in such habit-ridden communities.

Modern democracy is accordingly something quite unlike its classic and primitive prototypes. Democracy in classic antiquity was really aristocracy or oligarchy; in primitive times it was simply the rule of custom in a group of sympathetically likeminded individuals. Unlike ancient democracy, modern democracy is unwilling to recognize any subject or servile class, or indeed any class of adults who are excluded from political privileges. It rests rather upon the recognition of the potentially equal social worth of all individuals. Unlike primitive democracy, modern democracy does not rest upon the *customary* similarity of habits, feelings and ideas of the group, but aspires rather to rest upon the *rational*, intelligently formed

judgment of every normal adult individual in the group. It is a serious sociological error to confuse the various types of social life and of government to which the term "democracy" has been applied. Modern democracy, it is evident, is a wholly new stage of social evolution, and may truly be called "the great adventure" of our civilization.

The various stages in the evolution of social control will make plain to us the nature of modern democracy, and why it is the great advantage of the modern world. A review of these stages will show, in other words, the exact significance and nature of modern democracy in relation to social evolution. The lowest form of social control of which we know is that which rests upon instinct and upon the correlated selective processes of the natural environment. Such social control, if such we may call it, is characteristic of animal groups. But the lowest human groups of which we have knowledge show a very different type of control—that of habit, of custom and tradition. All existing savage communities of mankind show this type of control and we have every reason to believe that it represents the primitive human social condition. It is the type of social control which we find in the primitive democracies just mentioned. The control exercised by them was through the sympathetic and formal likemindedness which rested largely upon the sentiment of kinship; and hence the organization of such primitive democracies was of the simplest sort.

A third form of social control is that in which the control is exercised by the despotic power of a small group of individuals over a larger group. This control sprang from the conquest of one group by another. After the conquest and subjugation of one group by another, of necessity some sort of machinery of government had to be elaborated in order to establish and maintain the unity of the whole population. Centralized control in the hands of definite authorities became inevitable. Under such circumstances the war chief usually developed into a king, with his authority more or less limited, however, by the council of the conquering tribe. In many cases despotic forms of monarchic government gradually developed; but in some groups the tradition that the freemen of the conquering tribe were the source of authority persisted, and after the subjugated elements had become reconciled to their position as slaves, the former drove out their kings and distributed authority again democratically among themselves. Thus arose the spurious "democracies" of classic antiquity. They were democratic only with reference to the members of the conquer-

ing class. In essence, however, they were authoritarian societies, since the ruling class maintained its authority and the unity of the whole population through a fear-inspired obedience. Their utter unlikeness to modern democracy is evident. They belonged to the authoritarian stage of social control and of social evolution.

Authoritarian societies of one sort or another, whether styled "democratic" or "autocratic," have characterized the greater part of the history of western civilization from the earliest times down to the present. The most prominent national groups of the modern world until very recently have been of this type. But within the last one hundred years or so a fourth and higher type of social control has been gradually emerging in the most advanced nations of western civilization—a type of control in which the unity of the group is secured not through custom and tradition based upon the sentiment of kinship, nor through coercive authority, but through the intelligent purpose and will of the whole population. We may call this new type of social control "free society" in contrast with the custom-ruled and the authoritarian societies of the past. This is modern democracy. In essence it is a form of social control in which the untrammelled opinion and will of every adult member of the group enters into the determination of group behavior. As Hobhouse says: "It founds the common good upon the common will, in forming which it bids every grown-up, intelligent person to take a part."¹ It is much more, therefore, than a form of the state or of government. It is rather a new phase of social evolution, a phase which attempts to reconcile individualism and collectivism. Social control of some sort in every complex human group is necessary; but democracy would admit to a share in that control the wills of all the adult members of the group who show any intelligent interest in the control of the behavior of the group. Evidently there is a reason for calling democracy in this sense "free society." Evidently, also, it is a new experiment in the world's history, the nearest approximation being those primitive democracies of the past which were ruled essentially by custom and swayed by sympathetic rather than by rational likemindedness.

It is now evident why democracy, in the modern sense, is at once the hope and the great adventure of our race. It is the hope of mankind, because it is to groups what self-determination and self-realization are for the individual. It represents, if it can be successfully achieved, nothing less than the final phase of social control and of political evolution, the goal

¹ "Liberalism," p. 228.

toward which all human history has been striving. On the other hand, it is an adventure, because its success obviously depends upon the possibility of vast masses of men forming rational opinions and executing rational decisions as a group. Now this is only possible when there is adequate machinery to develop rational likemindedness and a rational will in the group as a whole.

Democratic society, in other words, must find a means of selecting among all the possible opinions which the members of a large group may develop the most rational opinion and of basing group decision and group action thereon. Modern democracy depends, therefore, upon free thought, free public discussion, a free press, free assemblage, and free selection of public policies and public leaders; for if we do not have free thought and free public discussion before a policy is entered upon, we cannot have that process of mutual education by which the most rational ideas are brought to prevail. Intercommunication, according to psychology, is a method of reciprocal adaptation between individuals; and as soon as freedom of thought and of public discussion are abridged the whole machinery of adjustment in a group will be hampered—it will be impossible to compare ideas and to come to a rational judgment regarding group policies.² In other words, it is only through free discussion and the formation of a public opinion, untrammelled either by the prejudices and emotions of the whole group, or by the interests and power of some special class, that democracy can be a safe and efficient means of social control. In democracy, then, it is public opinion which is the force that lies back of the power of all regulative institutions; and democratic society can be efficient and successful only in proportion as it succeeds in making public opinion rational and powerful.

Some of the difficulties of democracy, as a means of social control in the great complex societies of the modern world, now become manifest. For, how can we secure in such societies the free formation of a public opinion, which is at once rational and powerful? The day of government by "town meeting," or the formation of rational opinion through face-to-face discussion in a public assemblage, is past forever. In great groups, numbering millions, the press must necessarily be the chief means of intercommunication and public discussion; accordingly, it is upon a free and untrammelled press, yet one controlled by a high sense of social obligation, that the formation

² For elaboration of this point, see Chapters VII. and VIII. of the writer's "Introduction to Social Psychology" (D. Appleton & Co., 1917).

of a rational public opinion depends. The press to be efficient must represent all shades of opinion in the group. If the press is in the hands of a single class, or of a few corporations, it is almost bound to fail to represent the opinions of all classes and sections. Even more would it fail if it were under the control of one socialistically organized government. Socialism, thus far, has not grappled with the problem of a free press in any convincing manner. Newspapers, periodicals and books published and distributed by the state would be very far from a free press. Yet free public criticism is the very breath of life of that "free society" which democracy is supposed to represent.

Another difficulty of democracy, especially as a form of government, is that in modern societies it can not proceed upon the basis of unanimity, but is forced to adopt the principle of "majority rule." The decisions which democratic governments reach, accordingly, can usually be, even under modern methods of "direct" government by the people, only decisions reached by a majority. In nations consisting of millions it would be foolishness to contend that any social will had been formed when a bare majority had decided some social issue. At best, such a decision is but a temporary compromise. Definite social choice has not really been reached, and hence the whole situation remains unstable. But unity of thought, feeling and will is necessary for successful action in a group. Of course it is easy to exaggerate the dangers of bare majority rule; but there can be scarcely any doubt that a great deal of the inefficiency of democracies in the past, of their lax enforcement of law, and of their internal dissensions, is due to this fact. Further discussion and a more fully developed social consciousness regarding the situation are evidently what is needed, in a majority of such cases, to obtain a social decision which is truly representative of the will of the group. The safety of modern democracy, accordingly, depends upon employing every means of public education which will fully arouse the consciousness of the group regarding any given social situation. And this, again, depends upon freedom of intercommunication and of public discussion.

Another difficulty of democracy here comes into view; and that is, how far is the control exercised by the majority to go? If it goes so far as to suppress free opinion, free speech, and free discussion, evidently it is in danger of undermining the very basis of democracy. Rather democracy, in any intelligible sense of the word, is already destroyed when free thought, free speech and free discussion in a public press are suppressed

prior to the making of a social decision. But even in the case of decisions made by a majority, the possibility that the decision fails to represent the will of the group, or that it may be a mistaken decision, makes it important that free thought and free speech shall be preserved after a decision is made. Real democracy can only be safe when a minority has the right to try to convert a majority to its views by using all rational means to show that a social mistake was made. Hence the rights of majorities in true democracies can never be "absolute." There can be no absolute government in a true democracy, therefore, despite Rousseau's argument to the contrary. In practise modern democracies have not attempted, as a rule, to exercise control over the opinions, beliefs and practises of the people in many matters, as, for example, in religion. It is time that the myth of the absolute sovereignty of the state or government were exploded. Such a myth under autocracy may be very useful, but under democracy it is bound to be dangerous. It is time, therefore, that all modern democracies recognize that their principle is "limited majority rule" rather than "absolute majority rule." But the dogma of absolute majority rule prevails in most modern attempts at democracy, and perhaps nowhere more than in America. Under absolute majority rule freedom of thought, speech and conduct is bound to be lost; and democracy will turn out to be nothing more than the tyranny of a majority, which in order to maintain itself will seek refuge more and more in autocratic principles and practises.

It was perhaps the perception of this danger which led our forefathers to adopt the maxim, "that government is best which governs least." But we see that this principle of non-government is also dangerous to democracy, more dangerous perhaps, than the exercise of an absolute and rigid control by a bare majority. If modern social science has demonstrated anything in a practical sense, it has demonstrated that social control must extend over all of the activities and interests of life. The doctrine of *laissez faire* is dead because it will not work as a practical policy under modern conditions. We now see, as Mill said, that the function of government, as an agency of social control, is "coextensive with human interests." However, if government is going to embrace all human interests, and if democracy is the free formation of a social will out of all individual wills, it is evident that there must be a high development of intelligence and character in the individual citizen if democracy is to be "safe for the world." The individual citizen must understand the social consequences of bad industrial

conditions, bad sanitary conditions, poor education and corrupt living. But the democratic control of social life through governmental agencies is necessarily limited, in its direct action, to relatively *external* conditions. This being so, and democracy being dependent upon the freedom of the inner life of the individual, it is evident that *the success of democratic governmental control will depend not so much upon governmental coercion of the individual as upon eliciting his spontaneous initiative and intelligent cooperation.* A democratic government, in other words, to be successful, must represent the spontaneous and intelligent cooperation of the whole mass of its citizens in what Aristotle called "well-living." Strictly speaking, it is not a government at all in the old-fashioned, authoritarian sense of the word. It is rather the free, collective control of the whole group over the conditions of its own existence.

Under what conditions can democratic control over the conditions of collective existence be successful? Manifestly, only when there is a good degree of intelligent likemindedness in the population as a whole. No one has perhaps stated the matter better than Professor Giddings. In answering the question, he says:

Upon what basis have free communities risen and flourished? Always this: the people that have made them and maintained them have been sufficiently likeminded, sufficiently alike in their purposes, in their morals, in their ambitions and ideals, in their views of policy and method, to work together spontaneously. Naturally there has been among them what the old Roman lawyers called "a meeting of minds," so that without a whip over them, or a strong hand to hold them together, they have collectively carried on the struggle for existence and advantage, freely and effectively. They have all seen the same truth; they have all wanted the same success, they have striven by the same method for the realization of the same great purpose.³

But the old sympathetic and formal likemindedness which sufficed for primitive democracy will not work, as we have seen, under modern conditions; modern democracy can depend only upon *rational* likemindedness, and indeed it aspires to rest upon nothing less. But rational likemindedness depends upon the education of the whole body of citizens with reference to social and political matters. To be a success, then, modern democracy must educate the whole body of citizens in knowledge of social situations and in a sense of social obligation. Especially, must citizens be trained in the knowledge and art of self-government. This educational process should take place largely, of course, in our public schools; but every edu-

³ Quoted by Professor Newell Sims in his "Ultimate Democracy and Its Making," p. 72.

cational institution, such as the home and the church, should also do its part; and this social education must be continued throughout the adult life of the individual by the press and by free discussions in public assemblages and in "social centers." For only when there is a proper diffusion of social knowledge among the masses and an adequate inculcation of the sense of social obligation can there be developed such a rational like-mindedness as to insure the success of democracy. The whole people, in other words, must be kept in a state of continuous learning regarding social matters. The social sciences must be developed and given first place in the curriculum of our schools, and the mutual education in social matters which comes through the public discussion of social policies, either in the press or in public assemblages, must be encouraged in every way. One can not but remark here upon the foolishness, not only of placing restrictions upon the freest formation of rational like-mindedness and public opinion, but also of needlessly complicating the situation in communities struggling toward democracy by introducing illiterate elements, or those who through race, language or tradition are incapable of becoming rationally likeminded with the rest of the community. If such there be, a too widely open door for such non-assimilable elements must make democracy unworkable.

The problem of democracy must not be discussed, however, too exclusively from the standpoint of government. In its essence, as we have seen, democracy is a form of the social life in general, and not simply of government. Nothing could be more opposed to democracy than such hopeless poverty as prevents the normal development of intelligence and character in citizens. As Hobhouse says, "People are not fully free in their political capacity [even] when they are subject industrially to conditions which take the life and the heart out of them."⁴ There are other reasons, as we shall see, also why a form of industry which breeds poverty is essentially opposed to democracy. But as a form of social control democracy relates as much to the other institutions of social life as it does to the state and government. Democracy in the state and in government can not long succeed, indeed, unless democracy runs through the whole of the social life. We are beginning to see that a feudal or autocratic industry is a menace to democratic politics. We are also beginning to realize that the family, the school, the church and even "polite society" itself must be democratized if we are to maintain democracy in the state. Consequently, in the family life we find the old authoritarian

⁴ "Liberalism," p. 249.

family to be passing and a more democratic type of the family to be evolving. A larger and larger measure of democracy is being introduced into our churches, even though older forms of ecclesiastical organization may persist. Our schools are at least beginning to try out the principles of self-government. Most of our "free associations" are striving to organize themselves democratically, while in the most intimate personal relations of social life the most advanced peoples are seeking to realize democratic ideals.

Now it is in these smaller groups, in the more intimate relations of social life, that the real nature of democracy comes most clearly into view. In these relations democracy has been slow to develop because in them democracy is seen to be something more than a mere form of relationship among individuals. It is seen to involve a social and personal attitude of individuals toward one another. This attitude is not that of absolute liberty or pure individualism. Such individualism and such liberty are the negation of social control. They lead inevitably to the exploitation of the weak by the strong and to anarchy in all of the relations of life. Democracy does not mean, then, the emancipation of the individual from social control. It is rather, as we have already said, a form of social control which attempts to reconcile the inner, moral freedom of the individual with the needs of objective social life. To accomplish this it must necessarily be careful to avoid the destruction of the sense of social obligation by the inculcation of pure individualism. The liberty for which democracy strives is therefore relative to a deeper principle.

Neither is the social attitude which democracy implies that of absolute or dead-level equality. Such equalitarianism destroys the efficiency of social control, because it prevents that coordination of the group in action, that superordination and subordination of individuals which is necessary for efficient work on the part of the group as a whole. It is often said that the spirit of democracy is essentially opposed to the existence of classes. If by classes are meant privileged castes, then there can be no objection to such a statement. But if by classes we mean simply the necessary divisions in society for the performance of economic, political or cultural tasks, then classes are no more inconsistent with democracy than organized social existence itself. Even a football team must divide itself into classes, or various specialized groups of players, in order to act efficiently. Any social group, indeed, of any size which accomplishes anything must differentiate itself into classes. Only the democratic spirit insists that these class groups in society

at large shall not be artificial groups, but, like the class groups in the football squad, based upon individual merit and fitness. The classes in a democracy should greatly make, therefore, for social efficiency, rather than tend to lessen it. Absolute or dead-level equality, on the other hand, while it might temporarily gratify the egotistic feelings of those whose capacity and ability fit them only to play the part of "scrubs" in the social team, would destroy social efficiency, and so destroy the possibility of democracy becoming a success in a world where efficiency counts. Absolute or dead-level equality is, indeed, more in harmony with certain forms of autocracy than with democracy.

For these reasons the more careful writers on democracy have generally repudiated absolute liberty and absolute equality as dangerous to democracy. The liberty and equality which democracy inculcates are both relative to its fundamental principle, which, for lack of a better term, we may call "fraternity." By fraternity we mean such sympathy, understanding and good will among the members of a group that what they do collectively represents the uncoerced will of all—a spontaneous expression of the inner psychic unity of the group, or at least of a majority of its members. The liberty and equality of the members of a family group or a neighborhood group, for example, are not to be secured through the formal acceptance of liberty and equality, but only through the likemindedness, sympathy and good will of all the members of the group. Then such liberty and equality as is consistent with the total welfare of the group will emerge spontaneously. We now see why democracy is slow of realization in the general social life, while it has been so readily taken up as a form of the state or government. A doctrinaire democracy is possible in politics; but democracy will scarcely work in the face-to-face groups of men, such as the family and the neighborhood, unless it rests upon the social attitude which we have just called "fraternity."

If we are to have a democratic form of industry, for example, we shall not be able to get rid of such fundamental classes as "the chiefs" and "the people," or "the intellectuals" and "the manual workers," any more than the football team would be able to get rid of its captains, half backs, and full backs. But industry would have to be so organized that it would serve the welfare of the whole group. There would be need of such collective control of industry that the opinion and will of every individual in the group would count in the determination of industrial policies. There would have to be fraternity in the management of industrial enterprises and in the

industrial life generally. Consequently, there would also have to be equal remuneration for equal service, and a democratic participation of the workers in the management of every industry, but not to the exclusion of the public which it serves. Whether such industrial democracy implies complete government ownership or not, we need not here discuss. It is sufficient to point out that many socialists have found their chief hope for the coming of socialism, not in democracy, but in working-class supremacy or dominance. Socialism has existed in many forms of society in the past which were not democratic, and the fact that the revolutionary socialists of the present are not inclined to wait for the coming of socialism through the peaceful working of democratic machinery is perhaps even more significant than that some prominent socialists have recently repudiated representative government and declared that socialism will depend for its successful development not upon a democratic, but upon a bureaucratic social and political organization. Fraternalism in industry, however, can not tolerate the individualistic and predatory tactics which we now find only too often in our business world. The menace of such practises to the spirit of democracy does not need to be enlarged upon.

We now see that democracy is a spirit more than a mere form of either government or society. It is a stage in the evolution of the social mind and of social control—that stage which is characterized by the liberty and equality which spring from fraternalism, the recognition of the social worth and brotherhood of all men. Inasmuch as the democratic spirit is unwilling to recognize the artificial distinctions created by class, race or cultural condition, we see at once that modern democracy on its ethical side is practically synonymous with that movement in ethics which we know as “humanitarianism.” The safeguarding of democracy demands above all the growth of rational humanitarianism; for as soon as any individual, class, nation or race sets itself up as an end in itself apart from humanity, we must have domination, exploitation and so oligarchy or autocracy. The growth of class, national or racial interests at the expense of the interests of humanity is bound, therefore, to defeat democracy in the long run. To this extent democracy in any given nation is bound up with the triumph of internationalism. Only as we develop and maintain equality of right and of freedom among nations, as Condorcet long ago, and President Wilson recently, said, is democracy safe. As soon as one nation or one class begins to deny the rights of another nation or class it has left behind the spirit of democ-

racy. For this reason democracy is essentially opposed to the rule of force and is trying to put an end to that rule. The great justification for this war is, as President Wilson shrewdly saw, to put an end to the rule of force and to the violation of right by aggressive might.

In other words, peace, social and international, is necessary for the safety of democracy. It has long been remarked that democratic governments are built for peace, not for war, and we now see why this is so and why war of any sort, whether international or civil, tends to the destruction of democratic government. If democracy depends upon sympathy, understanding and good will, nothing can safeguard it like the peaceful development of civilization; for it is only the peaceful development of civilization which can make for the extension of that rational likemindedness which comes through science, and that good will which comes through humanitarian ethics and religion. The great enemies of democracy are those who, whether in the name of class or nation, destroy peace and good will among men to promote their own interests.

It is now evident also why both extreme conservatism and revolutionary radicalism are foes of democracy. Conservatism wishes to preserve institutions of the past which are no longer adapted to the present. They hamper the development of some section of humanity. To maintain them under such conditions becomes a rapidly growing injustice, and injustice, long maintained, destroys good will, and so the basis for social peace. On the other hand, revolutionary radicalism refuses to wait for the peaceful development of civilization to redress real or fancied wrongs. It invokes the immediate use of force, at least as soon as the opportunity is favorable, and so destroys good will. In practice, both extreme conservatism and revolutionary radicalism are accordingly found destructive of democracy. Only a rational progressivism in social and political policies will harmonize with the true spirit of democracy. "Liberalism" is perhaps the nearest single term that we have to describe this rationally progressive spirit.

It may be said that the picture which we have drawn of democracy makes of it an impossible social ideal, and that to "make the world safe for democracy" it would have to become a Utopia. If by this is meant that the world can be made safe for democracy only through the development and perfectioning of humanitarian civilization, we would accept the criticism. But it is no impossible Utopia, no impossible development of civilization, which we have pointed to. Rather it is simply the development of that spirit of rationality and good will in all

phases of collective human life which civilization at its best has always made its aim. To say that the fate of democracy is bound up with the fate of higher civilization ought, indeed, to be regarded as a truism. Two difficulties, however, do present themselves, which need yet to be cleared up. One is the old objection to democracy, that it presupposes a higher development of intelligence and of rational judgment than what the mass of individuals, even in the highest civilizations, are capable of. The other is the objection that if democratic control means only limited control over individuals we can never have social efficiency under democracy.

It may be pointed out that both of these objections fall to the ground as soon as we understand the real nature of democracy; that democracy does not preclude leadership or the highest degree of cooperation with leaders. Doubtless the mass of men can never be trained to be experts in the work of government or in social control generally; and such work, it may be admitted, in order to be efficient must always be done mainly by experts. But all the individuals of a free or democratic society can be taught to select their leaders upon the basis of adequate social knowledge and with patriotic and humanitarian rather than selfish or class ends in view; and they can be taught to coordinate their activities efficiently with the activities of their self-chosen leaders. Democracy does not necessarily mean, therefore, the control of ignorance and mediocrity, as Lecky charged, nor does it mean any necessary lack of social efficiency. The intelligence of a democracy can represent the highest intelligence of which the leaders it evolves are capable. Only it is evident that democracy, in order to be intelligent, must devote itself to the work of training social and political leaders as well as to the general diffusion among the masses of social and political information; and modern democracy has evidently not yet fully awakened to the importance of this matter of training its leaders. With trained leaders, and with the masses at large trained to take the social point of view, and to work cooperatively with their fellows, there is no reason why democratic societies should not be as efficient socially as authoritarian societies. Indeed, in the long run when the masses have been taught to play the social game and to play it well, they will be more efficient—just as the football team in which every member of the team knows so well how to play his part that he does not need to wait for directions from his captain is more efficient than the team in which every member waits upon direction from above before he plays his part.